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In September 2009, we hosted an unusual workshop at Duke Law 
School. The workshop focused on the empirical evaluation of judges, 
judging, and judicial institutions. Most work in this area has been 
driven by the agendas and constraints of empirical researchers, and 
empiricists from multiple disciplines—including history, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, and law and economics—participated 
in the workshop. But they were joined by judges and legal theorists, 
who were invited to take the lead in selecting the specific issues to be 
discussed at the workshop. The reason for the workshop’s unusual 
makeup and structure was our conviction that the empirical analysis of 
judging can be dramatically strengthened through the active 
participation of judges and theorists. In this Essay, we explain why we 
think conversations among these three groups are important. Then, 
drawing on the workshop experience, we describe where and how we 
believe that cooperation could do the most to advance the empirical 
study of the judiciary, with special attention to issues of evaluation. 
Before beginning, we should note that we paint with a broad brush 
here and likely fail to give credit where it is due. This Essay should be 
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read as a comment on general tendencies rather than on individual 
studies or people. To the extent that it can be understood as reflecting 
on individuals, we are not ourselves exempt from the criticisms. 
I.  GOALS OF THE WORKSHOP 
The empirical analysis of judicial behavior is one of the fastest 
growing areas of scholarship in the legal academy. The three of us bring 
different perspectives to this literature. Two of us, a legal scholar and 
a political scientist, have been involved in producing portions of that 
empirical literature. The third, a former federal prosecutor and United 
States District Judge and currently a law school dean, has been 
sometimes a critic but also a proponent. Disagreements among us are 
intense, with each at times finding the others’ perspectives on courts 
and judges perplexing and frustrating, if not utterly misguided. Yet our 
debates have resulted in agreement on three important points: the 
emergence of this literature in legal academia is something to be 
celebrated, its potential has not yet been realized, and its potential 
would be realized more quickly if judges and legal theorists played a 
larger role in producing it. 
One reason to celebrate the growth of this literature is the 
increased interaction between legal scholars and social scientists. 
Despite much disagreement between social scientists and legal 
academics on the how and why of studying judges, a number of scholars 
from each side have begun talking and working together, realizing that 
they can gain both new insights from each other and bigger audiences 
for their work. Because of the research experience and methodological 
expertise that social scientists bring to this partnership, the resulting 
body of work is likely to be more rigorous and reliable than if it were 
produced by legal scholars alone. 
But this collaboration also brings dangers—in particular, that 
methodological considerations will dominate theory rather than serve 
it, resulting in research that is hyper-technical and theoretically narrow 
or even irrelevant. If this happens, the research will be of little utility 
or interest to those who should care most about it, including the 
primary subjects of the literature: judges and those who depend most 
upon our judicial institutions. Further, neither judges nor scholars with 
training in other disciplines will be able to engage and be involved in 
the research project if it takes such a technical turn.  
To our eyes, there are already disturbing signs of a trend in this 
direction. Specifically, in its themes and methodological approaches, 
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the emerging empirical research in the legal academy tends to resemble 
the work that social scientists were already doing. Part of the cause, we 
think, is that legal academics and judges have been too reticent about 
the strengths they bring to empirical research and therefore have not 
pushed as hard as they might for work to move in new directions. Or 
perhaps it is that social scientists have been too aggressive in pushing 
their own perspectives, sometimes in a framework that is seen by 
judges as attacking them or mocking their aspirations. Either way, we 
do not think this trend best serves any of the groups involved. 
There is a different direction available, one in which the 
collaboration between legal scholars and social scientists expands to 
incorporate more perspectives, particularly those of the primary 
research subjects, and becomes more accessible, interesting, and 
relevant. Perhaps another way to think of this approach, congenial to 
law professors, is to think of the judges and the judiciaries as if they 
were clients and not subjects. 
A skeptic might correctly point out that our goals here cut against 
the dominant paradigm in empirical research across a range of 
disciplines, in which social scientists study phenomena from an 
outsider’s perspective. They observe and measure and theorize about 
their research subjects, but do not necessarily feel any need to interact 
with them; and certainly not as collaborators. We are overstating, of 
course. Our colleagues in anthropology and sociology, especially, 
incorporate the subject-perspective into their research. But their work 
has not figured prominently in the current enthusiasm in American law 
schools for empirical research on courts. We hope that in the future 
judges’ perspectives will play an increasing role in the research on 
courts.  
There is a different reason for our push toward increased 
collaboration between researchers and their subjects and that has to do 
with our goals. These goals are at least partially normative. We hope 
that the research can have payoffs in the near future in terms of 
yielding insights into how to improve the functioning of the judicial 
system. The three of us believe that the quality of the judicial system is 
important as a social and as an economic matter, and that aspects of 
the system can be measured and studied to help determine whether it 
can be improved and how. By contrast, there are others who are 
skeptical of the measurement project itself—arguing that no 
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measurement is better than partial measurement.1 The threshold 
questions, then, are what should be measured and how. 
II.  WHAT TO MEASURE AND WHY 
The questions for our workshop—what does it mean to judge well, 
how well do judges perform, and how can judicial institutions be 
arranged to promote the best possible performance?—are examples of 
topics that could benefit from greater intellectual cross-fertilization. 
Like all public officials entrusted with substantial power, judges should 
be subjected to critical appraisal: holding them accountable for their 
performance, identifying judges worthy of promotion, helping to 
decide who is fit to be a judge in the first place, or reforming judicial 
institutions to promote better judging. Judges themselves, in our 
experience, are interested in the question of what makes a good judge 
and, in many cases, would welcome research that attempted to tackle 
that question, particularly when the outcome of that research might be 
concrete suggestions for better judicial techniques or institutional 
arrangements. We are hardly making radical statements here; 
evaluative statements about judges and judging are far from rare. 
Indeed, we have colleagues who, although hostile toward any attempt 
to quantify aspects of judicial behavior, are comfortable evaluating the 
quality of this or that judge based on a selection of noteworthy 
opinions. 
The challenge we confront, for which we would welcome help 
from judges and theorists, is in identifying evaluative standards that are 
widely held, firmly grounded in theory, and amenable to rigorous 
empirical assessment. If we were to ask observers of courts about 
judicial performance, we might well reveal some consensus about how 
well judges do in general and even about which judges stand out as 
particularly strong or weak. But if we were to press our respondents to 
explain the grounds for their judgments, we suspect that the answers 
would differ, with many struggling to give an explanation or even 
define their terms. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, The Costs of Judging Judges by 
the Numbers, LEGAL WORKSHOP, (DUKE L.J., Feb. 25, 2010); William P. Marshall, Be Careful 
What You Wish for: The Problems with Using Empirical Rankings to Select Supreme Court 
Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 134 (2004) (“[P]lacing too much emphasis on quantifiable 
measures alone may . . . inhibit the selection of those with the qualities most needed for a 
successful Supreme Court tenure.”). 
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If we are correct that there is room for improvement in the critical 
evaluation of judging, the main reason is not that judges and scholars 
have been uninterested in the topic. It is not uncommon for judges to 
share their thoughts about proper judging in print,2 and one of us can 
attest that many judges who do not write on the topic still contemplate 
it privately and with colleagues. There also have been a handful of 
judges who have engaged the academic debates primarily to criticize 
academic attempts to measure judicial behavior through empirical 
study.3 Despite the apparent hostility of some judges, our impression 
from both reading and observation at our workshop is that the tone of 
their critiques is driven less by hostility to the idea that judicial 
behavior can be evaluated (and that there are better and worse 
performing judges and courts) than by the perception that academics 
are aiming wide of the mark in terms of conducting the type of research 
that might help improve the judicial system.4  
On the academic side, there is some work directly on the question 
of how to evaluate judging—including Solum’s (2003) theoretical 
exploration5 and Cann’s (2007) empirical analyses.6 Empirical studies 
 
 2. E.g., Armistead M. Dobie, A Judge Judges Judges, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 474–84; 
Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., What Makes a Good Appellate Judge? Four Views, JUDGES’ J., Summer 
1983, at 14, 14, 16–17; Joseph P. Nadeau, What It Means to Be a Judge, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2000, 
at 34, 34–35. 
 3. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1364–70 (1998); Bruce M. Selya, Pulling from the Ranks? Remarks on the 
Proposed Use of an Objective Judicial Ranking System to Guide the Supreme Court Appointment 
Process, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–83 (2005); Laura Denvir Stith, Response, Just Because 
You Can Measure Something, Does It Really Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1743, 1743–45 (2009). 
 4. Further, it seems that judges perceive a tone of disrespect in some of the academic work 
that seeks to rank judges on simple measures and reveal the secret “political” agendas of judges. 
David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, “Only Connect”: Toward a Unified Measurement Project, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1181, 1183 (2009) (“Judges . . . resent what they see as the obsession of some empiricists with 
proving that judges determine case outcomes based on their judicial philosophies, which the 
political scientists insist on calling ‘political bias.’”); Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, 
Response, Does the Supreme Court Follow the Economic Returns? A Response to a Macrotheory 
of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1782 (2009) (“[M]any empiricists . . . seem to default to less 
plausible explanations for judicial behavior—for example, that judges are voting their political 
viewpoints or trying to affect the economy. These conclusions seem . . . inaccurate—even 
offensive—to judges.”). 
 5. Lawrence Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 198–99 (2003) (“[J]udicial virtues include . . . temperance, courage, good 
temper, intelligence, wisdom, and justice. . . . Judges ought to be selected on the basis of their 
possession of . . . the judicial virtues.” (footnote omitted)). 
 6. Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and State 
Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226, 229 (2007) (basing an empirical study of merit selection 
efficacy on a survey of 2,428 state court judges who chose “‘making impartial decisions,’ ‘ensuring 
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of judges and courts have become more common, and many of these 
studies implicitly adopt some view of judging. Concerns about the 
quality of judging are an important motivator of recent research into 
heuristics and biases in judging.7 And even if they often go 
unexpressed, normative considerations about the legitimacy of judges’ 
behavior underlie the question that has garnered more attention from 
students of judicial behavior than any other: the extent to which judges’ 
personal policy preferences or moral views trump impartial 
interpretations of legal materials in determining their decisions. 
Outside of empirical studies, one may see the same implicit evaluation 
issues in certain theoretical work, such as in the literature on 
constitutional interpretation. 
Lack of attention, then, is not a major obstacle to progress in the 
study of judicial performance. In our view, a far more important 
obstacle is the dearth of intellectual engagement among judges, 
theorists, and empiricists. The result is empirical work that is often too 
far removed from the core concerns of theorists and judges to reward 
their attention and theoretical work that is typically too abstract to lend 
itself to empirical testing.  
Research into ideological voting illustrates this problem. 
Empirical scholars have amassed mountains of evidence suggesting 
that ideology plays an important role in judicial decisions, especially at 
the United States Supreme Court. But this evidence seems to have had 
only a limited impact on the way most theorists and judges think. 
Empiricists are often frustrated by what seems like a stubborn refusal 
to confront the implications of their findings, but there may be more to 
the reactions than obstinacy. For example, it may be that the distinction 
between the “legal” and “attitudinal” models does not capture all, or 
even a large part, of what is important for the legitimacy of judicial 
decisions.  
If we are right to claim that there is a problem, what can be done 
about it? At a general level, the crucial step is for judges, theorists, and 
empiricists to engage in structured conversations. Workshops like ours 
can help foster such conversations, and we hope to hold more of them. 
Larger conferences, such as those sponsored by the Society for 
Empirical Legal Studies, may also serve this purpose. In the end, 
 
fairness under law,’ ‘defending constitutional rights and freedoms,’ and ‘providing equal justice 
for rich and poor’” as the “most important” judicial duties). 
 7. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2007). 
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however, there is no substitute for reading each other’s writings. There 
have been signs of cross-disciplinary awareness in recent years. For 
instance, Judge Posner, who has always engaged the social science 
literature, is especially attentive to it in his latest book on judging;8 and 
two recent books by theorists include extensive discussions of social 
science research.9 Yet these authors are in a small minority. On the 
other side, many empiricists care about theoretical issues; in fact, as 
noted, the much-maligned attitudinal versus legal model debate is, at 
bottom, about the legitimacy of judges’ behavior and self-presentation. 
Still, caring about theoretical issues is not quite the same as reading 
theorists and judges closely and designing studies specifically to test 
their ideas or address their concerns.  
Of course, writers cannot place all the blame on readers. 
Empiricists might boost readership among judges and theorists by: a) 
explaining their methods and results in ways that are clear and 
unintimidating even to those without much training in empirical 
research or statistics; b) avoiding resting their analyses on assumptions 
that strike others as too unrealistic to take seriously; c) making the 
theoretical and practical implications of their research more explicit; 
and d) increasing their understanding of the law or legal framework so 
as to avoid making inaccurate statements or assertions. Perhaps most 
beneficial would be a greater focus in the first place on questions that 
judges and theorists could be expected to care about. For instance, in 
choosing criteria for evaluating judges or judicial institutions, they 
could pay close attention to the normative arguments of theorists and 
the practicalities of real life judging, the latter with an eye toward what 
we can reasonably demand of human judges or what they can 
reasonably hope to achieve. 
Like empiricists, theorists and judges are more likely to attract 
readers outside their own circles to the extent they refrain from 
insularity, eschew jargon, and avoid assumptions of knowledge or 
beliefs not shared by those outside the circle—admittedly, easier said 
than done. Most importantly, in thinking about their own work, 
whether academic or on the bench, theorists and judges could try to be 
more aware of when that work raises questions about the empirical 
world or rests on assumptions about the empirical world that are 
 
 8. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
 9. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2008). 
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questionable. Identifying such questions could make it more obvious 
to empiricists why they should read what theorists and judges write.  
The benefits of having theorists and judges suggest topics for 
empirical analysis would not end there. Many empiricists would likely 
find studying the suggested topics intellectually rewarding. Their work 
would, in turn, be read by more judges and theorists. The result, we 
suspect, would be a virtuous circle, with ever-increasing engagement 
among the different groups. 
III.  THE NEXT STAGE 
Our workshop experiences and impressions from reading tell us 
that suggesting questions for empirical analysis does not come easily to 
judges and theorists, perhaps because of reticence, skepticism, or 
certain habits of thinking. And empiricists are not especially inclined 
to listen to either theorists or research subjects about what they should 
be studying and how. That said, despite some apparent distrust or 
misunderstanding at the initial stages, there was ultimately a high level 
of intellectual engagement at the workshop. Whatever the causes for 
the initial difficulties in getting the conversations going, we hope 
theorists and judges will push to play a larger role in setting the 
empirical research agenda, whether through calls for action or, if they 
wish to be more directly involved, through active collaboration with 
empirical researchers. 
We end with four sets of more specific suggestions (or pleas) to 
different combinations of key players. The first, to academics—both 
theoretical and empirical—is to consider spreading their attention 
more evenly across a broad range of courts and judicial behaviors. The 
law touches people’s lives far more often and directly through state 
trial courts than through federal appellate courts. And then there are 
the local courts tackling small claims, traffic violations, and family 
matters; the administrative law tribunals; the international law courts; 
and similar court systems. All of these settings potentially provide rich 
sources of insight into the workings of legal institutions. Some of these 
settings have been examined by researchers, but these examinations 
are relatively rare and are frequently ignored in mainstream 
discussions of judges and courts.  
As important as decisions on the merits of cases are, it is just as 
important for us to understand how judges gather information, 
evaluate evidence, interpret precedents, rule on motions, choose 
language for their opinions, and so on. Further, whether in the criminal 
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or civil justice systems, most parties’ experience of the courts is not the 
traditional trial or a series of opinions culminating in the Supreme 
Court of the jurisdiction. Rather, it is a settlement system, through plea 
bargain or negotiation. But these truths, although reflected in many 
individual studies, are not well reflected in the literature as a whole, 
especially in political science and legal theory. Of course, we are not 
advocating that scholars stop paying attention to the U.S. Supreme 
Court and federal appellate decisions. Those who wish to reach judges 
and produce research with wider application to the world outside of 
academia, however, might achieve more success by focusing more on 
the issues of most concern to the typical judge and the typical litigant 
on a typical day. 
The second suggestion, to empiricists alone, is to consider 
embracing greater methodological flexibility. Both theorists and judges 
at our workshop seemed impatient with what they viewed as empirical 
researchers’ insistence on quantification, usually in the context of 
large-sample studies. Their criticism is overstated, given the large 
number of empirical researchers who employ qualitative techniques. 
Nevertheless, it has some validity both for the literature as a whole and 
for the emerging branch of that literature in legal journals. By no 
means do we think it would be appropriate for empiricists to weaken 
their standards in a way that would allow conclusions to be drawn from 
data that do not adequately support them. But, as long as they 
explicitly recognize limitations in their data, it seems to us that it may 
be worthwhile to sacrifice some reliability10 and precision if it allows 
them to get at things that really matter.  
Our third plea is to theorists and judges. They were no more shy 
about expressing criticisms of empirical work at our workshop than 
they have been in print. But their criticisms are seldom as constructive 
as they might be. It is of some help to an empirical researcher to hear 
why a particular method of measuring a key concept is flawed; it is far 
better to receive suggestions for improving the method. Is there any 
 
 10. To illustrate, Professors Gulati and Klein have collaborated on research employing types 
of citation counts to measure aspects of judicial reputation and performance. E.g., Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State 
High Courts and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009); David E. Klein & Darby Morrisroe, Prestige 
and Influence on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). Because the 
computation of these measures does not require independent judgment, they are highly reliable. 
On the other hand, although we believe that the measures are also valid, we readily concede that 
they only partially capture the phenomena of interest and could usefully be supplemented by 
measures that approach the phenomena from other angles, even if dependent on greater coder 
judgment and so more susceptible to reliability problems. 
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way of assessing the concept, even if imperfect, that would yield useful 
information? If not, is there a similar concept that could be empirically 
observed, allowing at least some light to be shed on the question? The 
key here, we think, is patience—for theorists and judges to recognize 
that a methodological difficulty is not necessarily an impossibility and, 
instead of dismissing the problem, to contribute their insights in an 
attempt to solve it. 
Finally, a request of judges. One of the most important things they 
could do to promote empirical scholarship that is significant and that 
matters to them is to actively embrace the spirit of scholarly inquiry. 
No one much enjoys being the focus of critical scrutiny, especially when 
being evaluated by measures that seem crude. (Consider how 
academics regard student evaluations of their teaching or their dean’s 
annual determination of whether they have “contributed” or not). But 
to the extent judges can overcome discomfort or resentment, cooperate 
with researchers’ efforts to study them, and suggest ways for 
researchers to improve their studies, they can significantly contribute 
to the research enterprise. And there is no reason why judges should 
only be subjects of research. They can also engage in research 
informally or formally, whether keeping their eyes open for how things 
are done in other courts and comparing those methods with their own, 
engaging in experimentation to test the effectiveness of different 
practices or institutions, or even conducting full-scale studies and 
publishing the results. We recognize that in the current political 
environment there are groups and persons who seek to damage the 
judiciary in general and individual judges in particular. From our point 
of view, this is lamentable. But these malevolent forces and special 
interests will gather and publicize their own flawed data and empirical 
studies. We ask the judges to consider that more and better empirical 
study of judging and judicial institutions has the potential to lead to a 
stronger judiciary and to better judging. It is also an antidote to slanted 
and partisan attacks disguised as objective studies.  
At the end of the day, we realize we are asking for a lot and that 
others might not be as optimistic regarding the value of collaboration 
among judges, theorists, and empiricists. What we saw at the workshop 
itself was a great deal of openness and willingness to engage. Given 
what we saw, we are certainly willing to do whatever we can to keep 
the conversations going. 
